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Progress on recovery plans to conserve endangered species is often blocked due to the lack of an effective
framework that technical experts and other knowledgeable stakeholders can use to examine areas
of agreement or disagreement about the anticipated effects of management actions. Multi-party,
multi-interest resource management deliberations, although increasingly common, are difﬁcult in the
context of recovery planning due to the range of potentially affected environmental, economic, and social
concerns. These deliberations are further complicated by frequent disagreements among technical
experts about how to identify and address various sources of biological uncertainty. We describe the
development of a decision-aiding framework as part of an inter-agency plan to assist recovery of
endangered Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), using a structured decision making approach
that encouraged constructive deliberations based on rigorous analysis. Results are summarized in terms
of developing an explicit set of management objectives, clarifying and prioritizing hypotheses concerning
barriers to recovery, comparing alternative management initiatives in light of biological uncertainty, and
incorporating resource constraints to generate preferred sets of actions. Overall, the use of a structured
approach to making recovery decisions improved inter-agency cooperation and facilitated dialogue,
understanding, and agreement among participating experts. It also helped to create a defensible basis for
further internal discussions as well as for communicating with external stakeholders, including resource
users and political decision makers.
Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Efforts to protect threatened and endangered (T&E) species are
among the most important of all tasks assigned to environmental
managers. Aided by passage of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in
the United States in 1973 and the Species at Risk Act (SARA) in
Canada in 2002, legal support for the protection of T&E species is
a cornerstone of North American environmental policy. Yet the
number of T&E species continues to climb at an alarming rate,
whereas the number of species removed from the endangered and
protected lists is disappointingly small (Scott et al., 2006).
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This paper emphasizes the need for a defensible and structured
decision-aiding framework as part of an effective recovery planning
strategy for threatened or endangered species. We focus on
development of a framework to aid recovery of endangered Atlantic
salmon (Salmo salar) populations in the northeastern United States.
During the period 2007e2010, the ﬁrst two authors (Gregory and
Long) were asked to assist an inter-agency group of scientists
(which included the other authors) charged with developing and
evaluating competing recovery strategies, as a precursor to the
subsequent creation of a formal recovery plan. The goal of these
meetings was to assist senior managers and staff in establishing
a defensible basis for moving forward with implementation of
a scientiﬁcally sound recovery framework and a broadly accepted,
collaborative management strategy.
Optimism initially was at least as scarce as wild Atlantic salmon,
in part because previous inter-agency management experiences
had resulted in frustration, a widespread lack of trust, and
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substantial conﬂict. Use of a structured decision making process
(Gregory et al., 2012) led to the development of an explicit set of
management objectives and evaluation criteria and an improved
understanding of hypotheses about key barriers to recovery. This
foundation provided a basis for effective inter-agency cooperation
and has been central to subsequent recovery planning efforts,
leading (in March, 2011) to inter-agency adoption of an ofﬁcial
Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework. A signiﬁcant key to this
success was recognition of the limited near-term role of improved
scientiﬁc results as compared to potential insights from discussions
among participating experts and the adoption of improved, and
broadly supported, evaluation and decision-making processes.
Special attention was given to methods for estimating the costs and
beneﬁts of management actions under conditions of substantial
biological uncertainty.
This paper provides a brief introduction to the context for
species recovery decisions, discusses key analytic and deliberative
issues, and provides an overview of the approach used in a series of Atlantic salmon recovery framework workshops to address
disagreements among participating scientists and resource
managers and to successfully develop broadly supported recommendations for near-term mitigation and research activities. We
also provide general suggestions for encouraging inter-agency
coordination and more effective decision making as part of
endangered species recovery planning efforts.
2. A decision making perspective on recovery planning
2.1. General issues in species recovery planning
The issues associated with recovery of a threatened or endangered species are complex. The objectives advanced to guide
conservation efforts are often vague, inconsistent, and controversial
(Tear et al., 2005). Scientiﬁc opinions on the beneﬁts of management initiatives are rarely marked by broad agreement; as Ludwig
commented a decade ago, often “there are no clearly deﬁned
objectives and a plethora of mutually contradictory approaches,
each of which is plausible in a particular frame of reference”
(Ludwig, 2001). Legal frameworks provided for species conservation remain ambiguous, particularly with respect to balancing
biological and ecological considerations with economic, social,
or cultural concerns. Public support in North America for
high-visibility T&E species (e.g., bald eagles, California condors,
grizzly bears) generally has been strong, but far less concern typically is given to less charismatic species or to the protection of their
respective habitats. Political support, at national and international
levels as well as from regional and local governments, is mixed and
this leads to conﬂicting messages and inconsistent funding for
critical studies and institutions.
The resulting mix of multiple players, social controversy, and
biological uncertainty results in many recovery-planning initiatives
becoming stalled, leading to frustration on the part of scientists,
resource managers and technical staff. In many cases, lack of
progress on recovery planning is due to disagreements about
preferred management strategies between participating scientists,
managers, and policy staff of the agencies or national governments
they represent. At other times promising initiatives are blocked by
other stakeholders, either through political means or through court
actions and litigation, who perceive their interests as being ignored
or given limited emphasis. In many cases, management policies and
political choices will emphasize short-term economic efﬁciency
over what are viewed as competing ecological or social objectives
(Healey, 2009). Important considerations, such as those concerned
with governance and equity, typically are considered to lie outside
the zone of inﬂuence or mandate of most recovery initiatives.
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Despite these many problems, there are numerous examples of
success in salmon conservation efforts. In our opinion, the key to
moving forward and successfully implementing recovery plans is
often the development of decision-making processes that can
facilitate focused discussions among the affected parties and
effectively address a broad mix of concerns. Instead, most species
recovery efforts continue to emphasize the development of an
improved scientiﬁc basis for making technical decisions. Although
we fully acknowledge the need for rigorous science as part of
recovery planning actions, we argue that many recovery-planning
efforts are stalled not by deﬁciencies in science but by deﬁciencies in how the values of the different interests are integrated
into recovery planning efforts.
At a fundamental level, the initiating force for efforts to conserve
or protect any T&E species is human values, not science. This
perspective is highlighted as part of conservation efforts targeting
salmon because of their important food, cultural, and health
beneﬁts, both to the general population and to coastal and indigenous communities. People care about the protection of species for
a variety of reasonsdbecause they are part of the natural environment, because they yield economic or social beneﬁts, because
they are part of heritage that should be passed on to future
generationsdand science can help point the way to effective
recovery plans. But the results of scientiﬁc studies cannot, in
isolation from the careful assessment of values, provide the information needed to make decisions about how much protection or
development is desired, how much uncertainty in outcomes is
acceptable, or how tradeoffs should be made across different
management objectives (Gregory et al., 2006).
2.2. Issues in Atlantic salmon recovery planning
Ocean-run salmon are iconic and highly valued; because of
recent population declines, efforts to protect T&E runs of salmon
are underway throughout the world. Declining salmon runs in the
northern Paciﬁc Ocean, for example, have received substantial
attention from scientists and resource managers in many North
American and Asian paciﬁc-rim countries (Bottom et al., 2009).
Atlantic salmon have been the subject of extensive management
efforts in the United States and Canada as well as several countries
in northern Europe (Haapasaari and Karjalainen, 2010). Yet due to
an unusual anadromous life cycledreturning to natal streams to
spawn after several years spent in the oceandsalmon also face an
extensive set of risks: changes to ocean temperatures or currents;
a variety of threats arising from marine pollution; urban and
industrial growth, which impacts estuaries and the interface of
oceans and coastal rivers; hydroelectric dams that block access to
rivers and streams; by-catch as part of other marine ﬁsheries; and
extractive resource developments that affect water quality and
temperature. Mitigation and enhancement efforts that address
these risks face the added challenge of a species with a 2e5 year
return cycle, which means that studies designed over 4e5 generations of salmon returns could run for decades.
The Atlantic salmon (ATS) recovery program in the Gulf of Maine
is a collaborative management effort among three primary
agencies: the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)dthe
parent organization of the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS)dand the Maine Department of Marine Resources (DMR).
The fundamental goal of recovery efforts is to increase the abundance and persistence of wild Atlantic salmon spawning in designated Gulf of Maine rivers (NMFS, 2011). A distinct population
segment (DPS) was designated under the federal Endangered
Species Act in November, 2000 for the Gulf of Maine (GoM) and its
associated watersheds; at the time there were eight known
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populations within the DPS, and in 2006 an estimated 79 adult wild
salmon returned. In 2009 the range of the DPS was expanded to
include three large rivers in Maine, the Androscoggin, Kennebec
and Penobscot; whereas historical populations numbered in the
hundreds of thousands, recent annual returns to this expanded
DPS are only about 3000. The decision to expand the DPS was
controversial (largely due to economic and political factors) but
clearly supported under the ESA: Atlantic salmon in the larger river
systems are closely related to those in the smaller coastal rivers and
there exists broad agreement among biologists that a wider
geographic focus is necessary to improve the feasibility and
potential for success of recovery actions.
Substantial progress has been made over the past decade
in understanding the biology of GoM Atlantic salmon and in
developing a conservation hatchery supplementation program.
However, population numbers for returning wild salmon have not
improved measurably and signiﬁcant challenges remain with
respect to development of an effective recovery program. These
issues were highlighted in two constructively critical reports conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) and by Sustainable
Ecosystems Institute (SEI). The NRC report (2004) noted that there
remain substantive disagreements among cooperating scientists
from the three participating agencies. As a way to move forward,
NRC recommended that recovery planning efforts for Atlantic
salmon adopt a systematic, structured approach to making
management decisions that focuses on understanding critical
uncertainties and developing strategies to address key sources of
ecological risk. The SEI report (2007) noted that the GoM Atlantic
salmon recovery program lacked a clear decision making framework to integrate management goals and strategies, including
research and mitigation activities, monitoring, stock assessment,
and hatchery production.
In 2007 the Atlantic Salmon Management Board (MB),
composed of representatives from the three lead agencies (in
cooperation and consultation with the Passamoquoddy Tribe and
the Penobscot Indian Nation), was directed to explore a new
collaborative approach for moving forward with recovery actions.
One aspect of this response involved a commitment to establish
a single recovery strategy, implemented by the three resource
agencies (with support from the Tribes) and with both management and research activities clearly linked to identiﬁable objectives. As part of this reorganization it was proposed that several
teams of staff scientists be established (under direction of the MB)
to develop speciﬁc plans for addressing priority hypotheses relating
to DPS recovery. It was also suggested that outside help be sought
for developing an overall decision making framework for Atlantic
salmon recovery, based on methods drawn from structured decision making (SDM) and decision analysis.
Five considerations were highlighted as key to the development
of a successful recovery framework.
2.2.1. Restore fully functional ecosystems
Populations are now at the point where most experts consider
short-term supplementation through conservation hatcheries to
be essential and long-term recovery (in terms of achieving
self-sustaining wild populations) to be extremely challenging. Even
with supplementation, and depending on the choice of quasiextinction threshold, the most recent ofﬁcial “status review”
report estimates that the likelihood of ATS extinction within the
next 100 years ranges from 19% to 75% (Fay et al., 2006). Along with
the legal mandate through the ESA (which is to recover the
ecosystems upon which listed species depend) there is a public
desire to ensure recovery of the species, which will result in
beneﬁts to the ecosystem and to society along with various costs
(e.g., changes to land and river use related to improvements in

habitat connectivity). Yet efforts to date have had limited success
and recovery plans are expected to remain controversial; Hilborn
(2007) recently noted that “No region in the US has generated
more political controversy over ﬁsheries policy” than New England.
Yet with returning numbers of wild salmon at historically low
levels, short-term actions are urgently needed if salmon in the GoM
are to avoid extinction.
2.2.2. Recognize tradeoffs across multiple dimensions of value
The need to strike a balance across different management
objectives complicates how biological and ecological considerations are addressed. In a perfect world for ecologists and conservation biologists, with the sole objective of improving conditions
for Atlantic salmon, recovery considerations would guide
construction of an ofﬁcial plan. Yet “real-world” recovery planning
is rarely so straightforward (Wilson et al., 2009). Instead, there are
competing demands for resources: what to one group is an
important species, in need of protection under state and national
laws, to another is incidental collateral damage resulting from an
essential economic activity. Similar conﬂicts extend to habitat
required by the species: cleanup of an estuary or re-opening
blocked spawning and rearing areas along a river are often
obvious actions to take on behalf of salmon, but the suggested
cleanup may be prohibitively expensive or the removal of passage
barriers may adversely affect other important uses of the river (e.g.,
including, for the state of Maine, the generation of electric power
from hydro dams or the provision of irrigation for agriculture).
2.2.3. Address biological uncertainty associated with recommended
actions
Probabilistic estimates of improvements in abundance, genetic
diversity, or other key variables are often subject to wide ranges.
Both the lack of quality data and the high costs and long time
periods usually associated with its acquisition mean that expert
opinions are, of necessity, relied on when creating recovery strategies and predicting their anticipated success. Yet eliciting and
aggregating the judgments of experts is challenging, and key issues
may be thought about quite differently by different experts; for
example, experimental types of habitat improvement or artiﬁcial
rearing (e.g., through a conservation hatchery) may be recommended by some biologists and opposed by others, not only on
technical grounds (i.e., there may be signiﬁcant disagreement as to
the associated facts) but on the basis of different risk tolerances
(i.e., the extent of uncertainty that is considered acceptable).
2.2.4. Recognize and anticipate governance concerns
Three different management agenciesdthe DMR, the FWS, and
the NMFSdall share responsibility for conservation of Atlantic
salmon. The FWS and NMFS also have trust responsibilities for
Tribes. In addition, a diverse group of stakeholders and Tribes, along
with local citizen groups and environmental organizations, have an
interest in the health of salmon stocks and the progress of salmon
recovery efforts. In the past, differences in legal authority, agency
procedures and protocols, and conﬂicting biological expertise and
advice have led to disagreements about the desirability of speciﬁed
recovery actions and delays in making decisions.
2.2.5. Recognize management and implementation concerns
In addition to the three levels of administration (or four,
including the Tribes) that contribute to ATS recovery planning,
there is a Policy Board that provides broad policy direction and
commits resources; a Management Board that formulates recovery
priorities, seeks consistency in both short- and long-range planning
for recovery actions, and allocates resources in response to the
strategic consideration of recovery priorities, and staff who are
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tasked with developing detailed work plans as well as overseeing
their implementation and monitoring the consequences of actions.
All three levels reviewed the draft Recovery Framework and
recognized that any recovery plans recommended by expert
participants would need to be shared with, and revised by, other
stakeholders before being brought to the attention of political
decision makers at the federal, state, or local level.
3. Methodology
3.1. A decision-aiding approach to structuring recovery planning
Discussions over several years among staff of the responsible
agenciesdincluding resource managers, ﬁsheries biologists, ecologists, and other scientistsdfailed to result in clear priorities for
ATS recovery. They did result in long lists of potential recovery
actions; however, these actions are highly diverse: some are likely
to generate beneﬁts in the short-term whereas others will require
many years or decades; some actions are inexpensive whereas
others are costly; some actions could easily be implemented
whereas others impinge on established uses of terrestrial or marine
habitats; some actions are stand-alone whereas the success of
others requires complementary activities to precede or follow. The
lack of organization means that comparisons across actions make
little sense. This is problematic because, for ATS and other T&E
species faced with sharp declines in population levels, urgent and
uniﬁed action is needed to reduce the species’ probability of
extinction.
Structured decision making (SDM) approaches, recommended
in the 2004 National Research Council review, combine the logic
and analytical techniques of decision analysis (Keeney, 1982;
Keeney and Raiffa, 1993) with insights from behavioural research
(Slovic, 1995; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000) and applied ecology
(Burgman, 2005). As a way to organize diverse sources of information and to integrate problem analysis with deliberation, SDM
methods have been applied in the context of a variety of other
species conservation problems (e.g., Conroy et al., 2008; Patrick and
Damon-Randall, 2008; Gregory and Long, 2009) and are advocated
by the U. S. Department of the Interior as a basis for the adaptive
management of natural resources under conditions of uncertainty
(Williams et al., 2007). The main contribution of an SDM approach
is that it takes information relevant to the diverse considerations
involved in species recovery planningdconcerns relating to
ecological, legal, implementation, uncertainty, governance, or
management issuesdand ﬁrst organizes them as part of a single
decision-focused plan that addresses both factual issues and values,
then asks a series of context-speciﬁc questions concerning tradeoffs across potential recovery framework components: What are
the underlying objectives of conservation efforts? What are the
expected consequences of different management actions, and how
should outcomes be measured? What conﬁdence do scientists hold
in proposed actions? Do agency afﬁliations result in biased
predictions? To what extent should ecological initiatives be constrained by economics? Is the level of agreement among experts
sufﬁcient to implement selected actions?
To answer these questions an SDM process typically seeks
to organize information relevant to a recovery plan through several interlinked and iterative steps (see Fig. 1). The intent is to foster
collaborative analysis and dialogue among participating stakeholders, with the goal of developing management alternatives
responsive to the expressed concerns and that address both shortand long-term goals of management agencies. Techniques used to
encourage deliberations and help structure key decisions
(described in more detail in Section 4, in the context of Atlantic
salmon recovery planning) include (a) consequence tables, which

Fig. 1. Steps in a structured decision making approach.

link alternatives and their anticipated consequences to objectives;
(b) inﬂuence diagrams, used to represent the causal relationships
among decisions, external factors, uncertainties and outcomes; (c)
strategy tables, used to stimulate creative thinking about
management actions; and (d) probability assessments, used to
characterize the uncertainty associated with key concerns (see
Gregory et al., 2012).
3.2. Decision framework development
As a ﬁrst step to creation of an ofﬁcial recovery plan, the
Management Board invited 5e7 scientists and managers from each
of the three lead agencies to a series of recovery framework
development workshops. The goal (and the focus of this paper) was
to lay the groundwork for a draft recovery framework acceptable to
all three management agencies, which would then be reviewed by
the Tribes, members of the public, and other affected stakeholders.
A structured decision making process was introduced with the
intent of overcoming years of limited coordination, lack of trust,
and poor communication, resulting in frequent disagreements
among agency staff. The MB was therefore faced with three primary
challenges: to determine an appropriate balance among the various
‘funding-worthy’ areas of short-term recovery activities (e.g.,
predator control programs in rivers or estuaries, barrier removal
programs in rivers, water quality correction programs, physical
habitat restoration options, and marine ﬁshery regulation
enforcement), to prioritize between short- and long-term recovery
activities (i.e., between management and research), and to create
an outline for moving forward that would be supported by both
scientists and managers from the three lead management agencies.
The participants also all agreed that estimating the beneﬁts of
recovery actions in terms of potential numbers of additional adult
returns was essentially impossible. Instead, it was decided that
a more helpful and realistic way to conceptualize the various
recovery plan activities was to link the future time frame required
for an action to its expected beneﬁts, since this would create
a sequence of recovery decisions and estimated outcomes. Activity
areas were deemed “funding worthy” if they could beneﬁcially
affect at least one of the following four areas:
- short term opportunities to begin increasing the natural
production of smolts almost immediately (e.g. barrier removal
programs)
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- research that might lead to highly-valuable, long term
conservation opportunities (e.g. marine research programs)
- necessary short-term but, in the long term, unsustainable
interventions (e.g. conservation hatcheries) that could help
prevent extinction of ATS before other activities reverse its
decline more sustainably, or
- activities whose costs are expected to be low relative to their
beneﬁts (characterized as “low-hanging fruit”), thereby
providing visible recovery beneﬁts while freeing limited
resources.
An important subtext was the need to understand and openly
discuss the pros and cons associated with creating a decision
framework to guide the evaluation of diverse recovery actions.
Several participating scientists expressed concerns that development of an explicit framework could hinder their ability to pursue
“pure” science. Others doubted whether a new system was
required, since the current division of tasks between managers and
scientists appeared to be working fairly well. Other participants
disagreed and cited the SEI and NRC reports as having noted, in
strong language, the need for an integrative decision making
framework and improved coordination, both across the three lead
management agencies and between resource managers and
scientists. Several participants also argued eloquently for adoption
of a fresh, decision-focused approach so as to move beyond the
conventional incremental tweaks to the status quo. Ultimately, an
argument in favour of developing an improved decision making
framework for Atlantic salmon recovery activities gained broad
support, reﬂecting the agreed-upon need to use a single set of
management objectives and criteria so as to better integrate
activities and funding allocations across the three agencies and to
provide a sound basis for moving forward with development of
a recovery framework.
4. Results
This section uses the six decision making steps shown in Fig. 1 to
summarize the sequence and results of the Atlantic salmon
recovery framework discussions. Our focus is on ways in which
analysis was used to encourage dialogue among representatives
from the three management agencies and, in cases where signiﬁcant differences of opinion existed, to explore ways to address or
resolve these differences as part of a mutually supported recovery
planning framework.
4.1. Problem deﬁnition
Five areas were identiﬁed as particularly important to the
development of a recovery framework for ATS.
1) Create a clear set of management objectives to guide recovery
actions.
2) Distinguish between research and management activities. The
former are focused on learning and reducing uncertainty, and
are designed to either increase the probability that an action
will succeed or to increase experts’ understanding of, and
conﬁdence in, its success. The latter are focused directly on
aiding near-term Atlantic salmon recovery.
3) Develop a better understanding of hypotheses that address
barriers to ATS recovery.
4) Encourage dialogue among scientists from the three lead
management agencies to identify key areas of agreement and
disagreement, with a focus on articulating the implications of
biological uncertainty for the evaluation of proposed management actions.

5) Develop an initial framework for linking identiﬁed recovery
priorities and leading hypotheses to near-term management
actions (recognizing that subsequent contributions from other
stakeholders will revise and inform this process).

4.2. Identifying recovery objectives2
The foundation for decision-focused recovery planning is
agreement on the deﬁnition of objectives (which later will be used
to evaluate candidate management strategies). This objectivessetting phase of a structured decision making approach takes
time, and our efforts to clarify the objectives expressed by participating scientists and managers were more than occasionally met
with complaints (along the lines of “ . . . can’t we just get on with
it?”). Yet we agree with Wilson et al. (2009; 258), whose review of
setting conservation priorities concludes that “ . . . problem
formulation is critical. Without a clear deﬁnition of goals . . . decisions are unlikely to be cost-effective, and outcomes cannot be
evaluated.”
Participants in these ATS recovery framework discussions
agreed to distinguish between fundamental objectives (those
things of ultimate concern to the Atlantic salmon recovery
program) and indirect or means objectives (which provide ways to
achieve a fundamental objective; see Keeney, 1992). Prior to the
start of these discussions, fundamental objectives had been deﬁned
as an increase in the abundance and the distribution of wild
Atlantic salmon populations within the DPS. Other objectives suggested during the initial workshop discussions included species
persistence, ﬁnancial cost, genetic diversity, healthy ecosystems,
urgency, collaboration, ﬂexibility (in terms of adaptive management), and ease of implementation (governance, politics). Consistent with the iterative nature of an SDM decision-making process,
further dialogue among participants led to agreement that neither
abundance nor distribution should be used directly as the fundamental endpoint for ATS recovery activities; there exists too much
uncertainty (particularly with respect to marine survival) to estimate ﬁsh abundance, and effects on distribution can only be
assessed at a project level once speciﬁc rivers are selected for
speciﬁed actions.
After additional discussion, two new fundamental objectives
were agreed to by all participants: minimize the short-term probability of ATS extinction, and maximize the long-term probability of
recovery of wild ATS ﬁsh. Much of the debate focused on the
identiﬁcation of sub-objectives, with participants recognizing that
recovery efforts require not only the increased abundance of wild
salmon over a wide geographic range (i.e., distributional concerns)
but also access to a functioning ecosystem and sufﬁcient diversity
(in genetics, life history, and morphology) to withstand natural
ecosystem variability. Although it was noted that many of the
speciﬁc actions needed to minimize the short-term probability of
extinction will differ from actions taken to maximum the long-term
probability of recovery, these same four sub-objectivesdincreasing
abundance, maintaining genetic diversity, increasing distribution

2
In the decision analysis literature (Keeney, 1982), the term “objective” is used to
refer to the identiﬁcation of a valued component and a preferred direction of
movement, e.g., “minimize the long term probability of extinction.” This usage is
subtly different in much of the ﬁsheries management literature, where objectives
are typically stated in terms of targeted outcomes such as “ensure salmon populations are maintained to X condition.” When setting regulations, clearly deﬁning
targets is essential. However, for the creation and evaluation of different recovery
options, the goal is to examine the multi-objective impacts associated with one
approach versus another. For this reason, we employ the decision analysis
convention when introducing objectives.
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(both within and across rivers), and improving ecosystem functioning (including habitat connectivity and effects on diadromous
or migratory ﬁsh populations)dwere included (albeit with
different weights) as part of both short- and long-term recovery
program objectives.
4.3. Using recovery hypotheses to identify management alternatives
To initiate an objectives-based discussion of possible management alternatives, participants focused on a discussion of hypotheses that addressed the range of factors thought to inhibit recovery
of ATS. Extensive previous work had been completed on hypotheses to explain population declines, including a comprehensive list
of hypotheses developed in 2000 (Cairns, 2001). Although this
listing is scientiﬁcally rigorous, it was recognized that it does not
translate easily into management decisions: the list mixes issues of
different recovery magnitude and different probability of success
and includes potential activities with widely varying time and cost
implications.
Signiﬁcant differences of opinion existed among the participants regarding how the different recovery hypotheses could best

35

be organized. Options included organizing actions by source of
threat (e.g., dams, marine survival, conservation hatcheries), by
location (e.g., downeast v. Penobscot v. mid-coast), or by limiting
factors (e.g., water quality, predation, hatchery stocking, marine
survival, passage, aquaculture, and habitat). Recognizing these
differences in perspective led to the development of inﬂuence
diagrams (see Fig. 2) showing impact causes, their primary mechanisms, and possible limiting factors. Similar decision aids are often
used to visually represent key relationships as part of environmental management decisions (Howard, 1988). In this case, we
highlighted mechanisms that connect different recovery actions
and their consequences as a way to encourage open discussions
among participating scientists.
Discussions about the mechanisms column helped to capture
and clarify participants’ initial assessments of the uncertainty
associated with the hypotheses covering causal relationships. For
example, the relation between turbines in dams and direct ﬁsh
mortality is relatively clear and there was little disagreement
among participants. In contrast, the relation between reductions in
marine survival of adult salmon and a variety of natural causes is
subject to substantial uncertainty and most participants agreed (as

Fig. 2. Example ATS inﬂuence diagram.
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shown by the question mark in this column) that so little is known
about the effects of management actions on marine survival of
salmon that it is difﬁcult (except in broad terms) to characterize the
anticipated gains associated with related mitigation or research
initiatives.
To review these different hypotheses in detail, a small number
of “action teams” were created to generate and review detailed
recovery activities that address the leading “barriers to recovery.”
Participants assigned themselves to one of the ﬁve groups,
which focused on recovery initiatives to be undertaken in freshwater (rivers), estuarine and coastal areas, the marine environment, or in conservation hatcheries (with a focus on either
increasing adult spawners or maintaining genetic diversity). For
each of these activity categories, participants were tasked with
creating detailed lists of possible actions (e.g., what could be
done to improve the marine environment, to maintain genetic
diversity, etc).
Strategy tables were introduced as a technique to aid discussions within each Action Team and to help move discussions from
a focus on projects (i.e., individual actions relating to single
hypotheses) to strategies (i.e., multiple actions relating to multiple
hypotheses). Column headings (see Table 1) denote the leading
types of management activities; these mirror the areas of emphasis
for each of the action teams. Rows depict different levels of
management focus, with relatively less intensive levels of activity
shown at the top of the column and more intensive levels at the
bottom. Alternative recovery strategies could now be generated, by
combining one or more management activities from each of the
designated columns, and compared in terms of their contribution
to each of the fundamental objectives. As one example, Table 1
depicts the ‘status quo’ strategy alternative, whose main components are shown by the circled items.
An important requirement in selecting and comparing these
strategies was the accurate deﬁnition of existing (baseline)
programs and the identiﬁcation of activities considered to be
mandatory for managers (such as stock assessments) as part of
legally required “due diligence.” One option that was raised (and
initially favoured) by some participants was to continue to fund
these activities and to consider only the additional actions that
could be undertaken with remaining, discretionary funds. Another
option was to consider all activities as discretionary, following the
logic that existing funds may be insufﬁcient to achieve even
minimum recovery goals and, as a result, decisions will need to be
made about allocating funds across essential recovery activities.
After discussion, this latter viewpoint was agreed to by all participants, which implied that funding for assessments was to be
included as part of the other categories.3
4.4. Understanding the expected consequences of recovery actions
The work noted thus fardcovering problem bounding, identifying and measuring objectives, and developing alternativesdis
a prelude to consideration of the estimated consequences of the
different management initiatives. At the outset it was recognized
that this was likely to be both the most important and the most
problematic phase of the recovery framework development
process, for two reasons: the difﬁculties associated with estimating
the beneﬁts of discrete recovery actions and, linked to this, the
biological and institutional uncertainty associated with the anticipated effectiveness of a speciﬁed initiative. As a result, we discuss

3
In hindsight, this decision was helpful in that it allowed for the comprehensive
depiction of alternative strategies, inclusive of all activities, and thus facilitated the
development of a coordinated and comprehensive set of recovery plan alternatives.

these two aspects of the recovery framework in some detail,
following a brief process review.
4.4.1. Process considerations relating to estimating consequences
The goal of the consequence deliberations was to efﬁciently
review the consequences of strategy alternatives in a way that
would encourage dialogue and help the participating scientists
from the three agencies to reach agreement on the expected
outcomes of proposed management actions. In addition, it was
recognized that the analyses of consequences should be documented clearly because they later would be communicated to, and
scrutinized by, members of the public, other stakeholders, and
elected state and federal ofﬁcials. Seven considerations were
emphasized:
 the expected time required before an action leads to an identiﬁable response; this is important because of the urgency
associated with recovery actions in the GoM.
 the desired sequencing of actions: what should be done ﬁrst in
order to facilitate or lay the groundwork for related and
subsequent actions.
 risk tolerances, which vary across management actions and,
perhaps, across GoM salmon stocks. For example, higher levels
of risk tolerance may be required for actions undertaken in the
marine environment due to the lower conﬁdence associated
with marine initiatives.
 the tradeoffs that exist within each category of management
actions. For example, conservation hatcheries may result in
both higher levels of risk to wild ﬁsh (by increasing competition for scarce habitat or food resources) and lower risk levels
(by helping to reduce pressure on wild ﬁsh from predators).
 the conﬁdence with which consequence estimates are made by
scientists.
 the anticipated ﬁnancial costs of implementation, assessment
and monitoring, and evaluation of the recommended recovery
actions.
 research beneﬁts and learning, including reductions in uncertainty through additional studies, monitoring, or adaptive
management initiatives.
In addition to using strategy tables to communicate the design
of alternative management strategies, the use of an SDM approach
allowed the MB to provide guidance to action teams on speciﬁc
issues such as the desired relative ratio of short versus long term
projects (for example: “ensure that at least 50% of value of the
freshwater projects will be on self-sustaining projects”) or the
desired geographic scope of proposed activities (for example:
“broaden the geographic scope of freshwater projects”).
4.4.2. Assessing the beneﬁts of recovery actions
Many initiatives designed to aid recovery of an endangered
species lack a clear framework for assessing and comparing the
different beneﬁts of alternative plans.4 Our goal was to develop
a “common currency” for estimating beneﬁts that would facilitate
the comparison of different project-level suites of activities
(recognizing that it would be imperfect and require reﬁnement
over time). Although participants from all three agencies agreed

4
Conceptually, the overall beneﬁts of conservation efforts are often expressed in
terms of a reduction in the probability associated with the extinction of a species.
For ATS, as for many other endangered species, this vague expression of beneﬁts
provided little guidance to resource managers charged with development of an
explicit recovery framework and little traction with either public or political
stakeholders.
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Table 1
Example strategy table (“Status Quo”).

Level of
activity

Level of activity

Low

Conservation
hatchery
(spawners)

Conservation
hatchery
(genetics)

Do nothing:
deommission
and release
current stocks

Do nothing

Live gene
bank

Frozen gene
bank

Opportunistic
habitat
restoration,
research

Active riverspecific stocking
(7 rivers); minimum
hatchery activity
evaluation

Maintain
genetic
broodstock
mgt plan

Targeted/
strategic
projects

Increase production,
scope (#, lifestages,
etc.); based on
active hatchery
activity evaluation

Expand
genetic
analysis of
wild fish;
extend
beyond
hatchery

Direct
experiments

Direct
experiments

Marine

Estuary

Fresh water
(smolts)

Minimal
presence at
NASCO and
ICES

Maintain
minimum
Sec 7 & 10
presence

Maintain
minimum
Sec 7 & 10
presence

International
collaboration

National
collaboration

Direct
monitoring

Direct
monitoring

Direct
experiments

Direct
experiments

Regulatory
outreach projects,
absolute high
priority only

High

that development of a single metric for expressing beneﬁts would
be helpful, it also was recognized that, because one action may
inﬂuence several objectives, its beneﬁts will vary depending on the
perspective that is adopted. For example, there was widespread
agreement that an action which produces more ﬁsh from
a conservation hatchery would perform well on an objective that
tracks “minimizing the probability of extinction in the short term”
but there was substantial disagreement regarding its performance
on objectives that concern longer term recovery viability or that
address the maintenance of genetic diversity.
Several different possible approaches to beneﬁts assessment
were discussed. A ﬁrst approach would simply ask the group to
decide on a qualitative ranking of beneﬁts importance (e.g. 1e5) for
each proposed action or research project. Although the virtue of
this approach is simplicity, its weakness is ambiguity because it
bundles the many dimensions of ‘importance’ into one rating. A
second option, with strong historical roots in the context of ATS
recovery planning, involved development of a Threat Severity
Index (TSI), with threats scored on a 1e3 scale as a function of
impact magnitude and severity. However, several participants
pointed out thatdas the name suggestsdthe TSI was developed to
characterize threats, not to evaluate actions intended to address
those threats.
A key insight at this point was the recognition that the relative
value of an action must include both its biological intent and its
likelihood of success; otherwise, a project that is very unlikely to
succeed, if directed at a wide range of geographic areas and
life-stages, could be judged a prime candidate for scarce funds. This
distinction encouraged participants to think about these two
aspects of the problem independently; the biological signiﬁcance

of each targeted barrier to recovery and the technical effectiveness
of the recovery action at mitigating the barrier.
In light of the importance of these two considerations, participants agreed to an explicit expert judgment process whereby the
beliefs of each individual could be articulated and compared
(Burgman, 2005). Group members were ﬁrst asked, for each of the
ﬁve major “barriers to recovery” activity areas, to provide their best
judgment about the likely relative contribution of each category to
recovery. Next, they were asked to weight the anticipated effectiveness of the associated recovery activities. These results were
tabulated and normalized (so that participants’ weightings would
sum to 1) and then presented to the group for discussion, using two
summary ﬁgures. Fig. 3 shows the range, 80% judgment intervals,
and “most likely” estimates for the relative contribution to recovery
for each of the ﬁve activity categories. Fig. 4 shows the same results
for the judged (relative) effectiveness of actions that realistically
could be undertaken by the MB within each activity category.
Important information is contained in these decomposed
judgments, information that previously had not been available to
the participating scientists.5 First, the range of estimates varies
considerably across participants. Looking at the 80% limits shown in

5
The value of expert judgment elicitations is that they make explicit information
held in the minds of participating individuals that otherwise would not be accessible as part of analyses. Despite the extensive use of expert judgments to help deal
with uncertainties and the proven record of the technique (see Morgan and
Henrion, 1990 or Meyer and Booker, 1991), scientists often complaindas they did
heredthat the explicit probabilistic articulation of their views will prove disruptive
or interfere with their pursuit of good science. In fact, just the opposite is usually
the case.
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Fig. 3. Judged contribution to recovery of each activity category (showing minimum and maximum estimates, most likely or 50th percentile estimates, and 80% conﬁdence
interval).

Fig. 3, for example, differences in the assessed contribution to
recovery of “increasing marine survival offshore” are substantial,
with some participants giving this activity category an average
weight of 0.2 (across the ﬁve categories) and others giving it a much
higher weight; a weight of 0.5, for example, is equal to the
combined contribution of all other activity categories. Second, both
the relative contributions to recovery and the assessed effectiveness vary considerably across the ﬁve activity categories. However,
there is general agreement among participants on at least the rank
order (when shown as averages) across the categories, with
“increasing marine survival” assessed as the most important category for recovery contribution (see Fig. 3) and conservation
hatchery and freshwater activities (maintaining genetic diversity &
increasing adult spawners) judged the most likely to be effective
(see Fig. 4). Third, actions associated with the activity category
showing the highest expected contribution to recovery (increase
marine survival offshore) are given the lowest effectiveness score,
whereas conservation hatchery activities are scored lowest in terms
of their contribution to recovery but are given relatively high
effectiveness scores. These results highlight one of the fundamental
dilemmas facing the recovery framework process: the (arguably)
leading cause of population decline, marine survival, is also the
category for which management actions are least likely to be
effective, whereas the expected beneﬁts of conservation hatcheries,
widely considered to be an effective and well-understood
management tool, are rated quite low in terms of their anticipated contribution to recovery.
These ﬁndings stimulated development of another approach to
beneﬁts assessment, based on previous research using population

viability analysis (or PVA; see Legault, 2005) to estimate abundance
levels associated with recovered populations. The resulting model
can be used to estimate extinction probabilities, including information on criteria such as population age structure. A working
group, composed of a sub-set of participants from all three agencies
(G. Mackey, DMR, coordinator; Tim Sheehan, NOAA; Mike Millard
& John Sweka, FWS), was formed to ﬁne-tune this approach and
then report back to the larger group. The work of this sub-group led
to development of a Biological Beneﬁt Index (BBI) for Atlantic
salmon recovery efforts, based on the anticipated effects of an
action on each of the six salmon life stages. Two main elements
are addressed:
 Beneﬁt scoring. The beneﬁts of a potential management action
or research project to each life stage (egg, fry, parr, smolt,
marine, and adult return/spawner) were rated by the group
participants on an ordinal scale, from 0 (no or unknown
beneﬁt) to 3 (high beneﬁt). These ratings also were informed
by a matrix population model approach (Robertson, 2005),
reﬂecting the probability of an individual ﬁsh at stage i and
time t successfully transitioning to stage j at time t þ 1. The
associated calculations make use of the concept of elasticities
as a measure of the proportional sensitivity of the population
growth rate to underlying survival and fecundity rates (Heppell
et al., 2000), which are then multiplied by the amount of time
spent in each transitional stage.
 Importance weights. The BBI calculation takes the assessment of
the expected magnitude of the beneﬁts of an action and
weights it in terms of (a) the geographic area to which the

Fig. 4. Judged effectiveness of ATS actions to inﬂuence each activity category (showing minimum and maximum estimates, most likely or 50th percentile estimates, and 80%
conﬁdence interval).
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approach is applicable, using (b) a multiplier based on
a weighted sum of the affected life-stages. Weights placed on
each life stage were hidden from users in order to avoid biasing
the scores associated with each life stage; after these scores
were compiled, participants were informed that (consistent
with common sense) the highest weight was calculated for
beneﬁts associated with the marine life stage, whereas the
lowest weight was calculated for fry and smolt life stages.
After extensive discussion, this BBI approach to beneﬁts
assessment was adopted by all the participating scientists and
managers and used to assess and compare the biological beneﬁts of
the different proposed recovery activities.
4.4.3. Addressing uncertainty in consequence estimates
The other principal difﬁculty affecting beneﬁt estimates of
different management initiatives is that there is substantial biological uncertainty. This takes three major forms:
- uncertainty with respect to the extent to which initiatives
undertaken in each action category, assuming they are
successful, will be able to inﬂuence recovery of ATS populations. As shown in Fig. 3, there is more uncertainty associated with the extent to which activities intended to increase
marine survival will inﬂuence ATS recovery than there is for
increasing adult spawners through conservation hatchery
activities.
- uncertainty with respect to the anticipated ability of management actions to make a difference with respect to each of the
ﬁve identiﬁed activities categories. As shown in Fig. 4, the
ability of activities funded through an ATS recovery program to
inﬂuence marine survival is thought to be substantially lower
than the program’s ability to increase adult spawners through
fresh-water smolt production.
- uncertainty with respect to scientists’ conﬁdence in their own
judgments that the estimated levels of beneﬁts associated with
an action or strategy will be realized. To highlight this third
source of uncertainty, an expert judgment process again was
used to elicit information from participants, using a simple
three-point scale of “very conﬁdent” (that judged beneﬁts will
be realized), “somewhat conﬁdent,” and “long shot.” These
judgments were made by the respective action team members
on each of the disaggregated activities proposed by their
groups, which entailed substantial (albeit highly useful) effort
and dialogue.
Discussions about how to address these different sources of
uncertainty emphasized two additional considerations. First,
although ATS recovery efforts are subject to many sources of
uncertainty, not all of these are equally important: efforts to
monitor or resolve uncertainty should take these differences into
account (for example, using formal Value of Information analysis;
see Runge et al., 2011). Second, participants discussed the implications of risk tolerance for the creation of a more robust overall
recovery strategy. The information summarized in Figs. 3 and 4
reﬂects participants’ technical judgments based on their understanding of the problem and the conﬁdence held in their own
knowledge. To directly aid recovery framework development, these
assessments need to be complemented by value judgments concerning the acceptable level of risk associated with research or
mitigation activities undertaken within each category (i.e., as recommended by each action team). For example, it may be necessary
to accept a higher level of risk for activities designed to improve
marine survival of salmonids, whereas for conservation hatchery
activities it may be desirable to accept a relatively lower level of risk
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(in light of the short-term survival emphasis of hatchery actions). In
addition, many participants emphasized the importance of developing robust recovery strategies, deﬁned as ones reasonably likely
to be effective in achieving their objectives over a wide range of
both internal and external uncertainties (Lempert et al., 2006).
Depending (in part) on their respective risk tolerances, managers
could prefer a recovery strategy that was anticipated to be more
robust with respect to ecological objectives even though achieving
this might result in lower or less satisfactory results on some other
valued objective, for example cost or implementation ease. This
additional layer of tradeoffs was highlighted as part of the recovery
framework discussions but additional and more speciﬁc analysis
was left for the later stages of the recovery planning process.
4.5. Revising management alternatives in light of constraints
Up to this point the analysis had compared actions and scenarios
in terms of ecological, economic, and other considerations but had
not directly faced the reality of ﬁnancial and personnel constraints.
To help participants address resource constraints, a multi-year
portfolio-building tool was developed (using an Excel Spreadsheet base) to aid each of the action teams in moving from desired
strategies to portfolios of actions that address the designated
objectives, consistent with available ﬁnancial and personnel
constraints (as measured by dollar expenditure limitations and
designated “full-time equivalents,” or FTEs). Our starting point was
to develop consistent criteria for comparing the comprehensive
lists of activities provided by each Action team. This evaluation was
done on the basis of ten activity attributes, which together provide
a relatively complete accounting of critical project characteristics.
These included (in random order):













the geographic extent of a project
the percentage of occupied area
the calculated biological beneﬁts index BBI),
the endurance of beneﬁts (deﬁned as whether an action would
be self-sustaining or require ongoing inputs),
the beneﬁts timeframe (the degree to which beneﬁts would be
expected within the short term, deﬁned as three salmonid
return cycles),
the initiation timescale (whether the start of beneﬁts is
expected within 1e3 years, 3e5 years, or only after ﬁve or more
years),
scientists’ conﬁdence that the beneﬁts will be realized,
social or political issues that might serve as “showstoppers,”
genetic risks, to Atlantic salmon or to other species, and
the possible beneﬁts to other species.

As expected, differences were encountered across action teams
in their approaches to the decomposition of projects and initial
level of detail (e.g., some lists contained several hundred possible
actions, others only 10 or 20); this served as a jumping-off point for
further discussion, re-grouping of projects, and prioritization with
the result that ﬁnal project lists of all action teams were more easily
comparable. In addition, because many recovery activities do not
make sense to undertake unless they can be implemented at
a sufﬁcient scale, participants were asked to assess the minimum
resource investment that would be required (in terms of both
dollars and personnel) for this action to make a difference to ATS
recovery. These judgments set a lower bound for levels of activity.
In the same spirit, participants were asked to assess the beneﬁts
associated with the activity if, instead, a more generous level of
resource investment were to become available. The pragmatic
nature of these judgments brought home the “real-world” implications of the recovery decisions being made and, although
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Table 2
Resource Allocations Across Alternative Portfolios of Actions.
Alternative Portfolios (percent of budget allocation)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Increase Marine Survival Offshore
Increase Estuary-Coastal Survival
Maintain Genetic Diversity through Conservation Hatchery
Increase Adult Spawners through Conservation Hatchery
Increase Adult Spawners via FW Production of Smolts
Population Monitoring Assessmenta

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

P6

“Status
Quo”

“Marine
Focus”

“Hatchery and
Estuarine Focus”

“Freshwater
and Hatchery”

“Freshwater Connectivity
and Diadromous”

“Marine and
Estuarine Focus- live
gene bank”

10%
6%
5%
32%
25%
22%

40%
4%
5%
32%
17%
2%

5%
20%
8%
50%
15%
2%

5%
3%
10%
50%
30%
2%

5%
16%
5%
32%
40%
2%

30%
25%
4%
20%
19%
2%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

a

For the Status Quo alternative, population monitoring and assessment was characterized separately; for the other alternatives, it was bundled (for reasons of efﬁciency and
logic) into each of the ﬁve activity areas.

difﬁcult, helped the decision making process to gain support
from participating scientists and managers.
This reﬁned database of potential projects and activities was
now ready to use in creating an initial resource-constrained set of
portfolios of actions. Table 2 shows the resulting “resource allocation” table, which uses percentage budget allocations to show
the approximate maximum percent of resources available to
a range of initial “bookend” portfolios, consistent with the legal
and practical requirements of other activities. For example,
participants judged that a maximum of 40% of overall resources
(row 1) could be made available to help increase marine survival as
part of the bookend “Marine Focus” portfolio, whereas 72% of
annual resources (rows 4 and 5) could be made available to help
increase adult spawners as part of the designated “Freshwater
Connectivity” alternative.

4.6. Comparing recovery management alternatives
As part of an SDM (or other multi-attribute) approach, the
estimated consequences of management alternatives are compared
in terms of the speciﬁed objectives (Keeney, 1982; Gregory et al.,
2012). For ATS recovery planning, this means that the six
different sets of resource-constrained management actions shown
in Table 2 need to be compared in terms of their ability to achieve
progress on the fundamental recovery objectives and component
sub-objectives: abundance, distribution, genetic diversity, and
ecosystem function. Overall assessments for each portfolio therefore were made for minimizing the short-term probability of
extinction [P(Ext)] and for maximizing the long-term probability of
recovery of wild ﬁsh [P(Rec)]. Abundance was represented through
the proxy indicator of the sum of the biological beneﬁts index (BBI)
for each of the action team areas (with a resource-weighted BBI
used in the case of Estuary activities). For the other sub-objectives,
different aggregate values were drawn from the available data. For
example, the extent to which genetic diversity was different across
the range of alternatives was indicated by the proxy of the average
number of geographical units (SHRUs) being affected in each
portfolio. The greater the geographical spread of the activity, the
better the assumed performance on the objective of “genetic
diversity.” Similarly, “Ecosystem Function” performance was represented by the number of activities that were characterized as
bringing “beneﬁts to other species.”
When normalized across the range of alternative portfolios,
these summary results provided an indication of which alternatives might perform better (or worse) than others on each
account. Since the goal is to identify a preferred portfolio of

actions, this information is needed to help participating scientists
and managers compare the anticipated outcomes of different
actions on the expressed objectives and to clearly recognize
trade-offs across the different portfolios of actions. However, two
further steps were required. First, because not all objectives or
sub-objectives are weighted equallydsome differences in the
expected level of changes in an alternative across selected
management actions will be more importantdparticipants were
asked to provide explicit weights for the different objectives
across the six alternatives. A simple weighted sum algorithm was
used on a participant-by-participant basis to create an individual
score for each alternative. This formed the basis of further
discussions about which projects truly contributed to which
objectives, to what degree, and the relative importance of the
different objectives.
Second, it was recognized that each of the six portfolios that
previously had been constructed were preliminary; in particular,
because they were developed to illustrate and test the decisionaiding recovery planning framework, each focused on only
a single consideration (e.g., the production of fresh-water smolts or
improvements in marine survival). A necessary next step was to
build several new portfolios that could draw from the strengths
represented across several activity categories. After further
discussion and review, four more portfolios were therefore suggested: one was developed through a coordinated, across-agency
discussion (portfolio 7) and three others (portfolios 8, 9, and 10)
were designed as sensitivity analyses, added to illustrate what
might occur if budgets were to be increased. Using the interactive
graph shown in Fig. 5, participants could immediately review the
relative performance of these ten alternatives: the six equally
funded portfolios (2e7) along with portfolio 1 (whose costs do not
include stock assessment) and the three portfolios funded at
higher levels (8e10). As might be expected, as funds increase so too
do the overall scores. After further discussion, and aided by the
recognition that the higher level of funding represented by portfolios 8, 9, and 10 was unlikely to be forthcoming, portfolio 7 was
selected by participating scientists and managers from all three
agencies as the preferred option.6 This shared assessment marked
signiﬁcant progress in the development of a uniﬁed, across-agency
approach to ATS recovery planning.

6
Consistent with the iterative nature of the SDM process and the importance of
subsequent input from other stakeholders and Tribes, this result served only as
a test run of the “decision framework” approach and as an input to subsequent (and
ongoing) recovery discussions, which also were able to reﬂect new information and
the views of new participants in the recovery planning process.
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P(Ext) / Abundance / Marine

Overall Weighted Score for All Portfolios (Average)

P(Ext) / Abundance / Estuary
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0.900
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0.800
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0.600

0.65

0.64

0.700
0.56

0.500

0.55
0.41

0.44

0.400
0.300

1.00

P(Ext) / Abundance / Hatchery

0.90

P(Ext) / Abundance / FW Smolts

0.80

P(Ext) / Genetic Diversity

0.70

P(Ext) / Abundance / Distribution

0.60
0.50

P(Ext) / Abundance / Ecosystem
Function
P(Rec) / Abundance / Marine

0.40

P(Rec) / Abundance / Estuary

0.30
0.17

0.200

0.20

0.100

0.10
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P1
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P8
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P10

P(Rec) / Abundance / Ecosystem
Function

Fig. 5. Overall weighted portfolio scores. Note that only portfolios 2e7 are equally funded; Portfolio 1 does not include costs of stock assessment and portfolios 8e10 are funded at
a higher level.

4.7. Encouraging recovery framework improvements through
collaborative learning
An important process objective of the recovery-planning
framework was to provide a ﬂexible mechanism for incorporating
learning. It was also recognized that, because of the uncertainty
associated with the outcomes of many of the proposed recovery
initiatives, learning over time would help to inform scientists and
the MB about the utility of different recovery activities. Some of this
information would come from ongoing monitoring efforts. Other
information will come to light over time through input from other
stakeholders. Additional information should arise from learning
that takes place at other locations or as part of other related
recovery programs.
Learning is central to any structured decision-making process:
participants learn about the precise deﬁnition of recovery framework objectives, they learn about the value-based tradeoffs placed
on the achievement of different objectives, they learn about each
others’ views and assumptions, and they learn about the extent to
which different recovery activities might complement or interfere
with each other (Gregory et al., 2012). By providing an overall
structure for organizing the different sources of new information,
one of the goals of a decision-aiding SDM recovery framework is to
make learning transparent and easily accessible, so that it can more
easily be incorporated into both participants’ understanding of
recovery issues and the plans advanced by the lead management
agencies. A related goal of the explicit decision framework is to
assess the anticipated beneﬁts, costs and risks associated with
learning, thus providing a perspective on whether the anticipated
gains of a proposed research or adaptive management initiative are
likely to exceed the associated costs (e.g., in terms of added time or
expenditures). This perspective is consistent with the overall goal
of developing more resilient management initiatives, now recognized to be an important consideration as part of many salmon
conservation efforts in North America (Healey, 2009).
5. Conclusions
A decision-focused approach to recovery framework development differs fundamentally from what generally is done as part of
most species conservation efforts, which can be characterized as
science-based or biology-based approaches. A science-based
approach is one that pursues opportunities for which “ . . . the

target is moredmore protection, more restoration, and more
management” (USGS, 2006). As one participant noted, the
conventional model might also be characterized as a “trust me, I’m
an expert” model: if participating scientists are allowed to do their
jobs, and if managers from the respective agencies also are
permitted to do their jobs, then things will work out as well as they
can.
As noted in the 1996 National Research Council report
“Understanding Risk” (NRC, 1996) as well as the 2004 report
“Atlantic Salmon in Maine” (NRC, 2004), a science-focused model
to recovery planning is open to criticism on several fronts: it lacks
an explicit and transparent framework for making choices, it
generally fails to provide for sufﬁcient collaboration among the
lead management agencies, and it supports neither a defensible
basis for communicating with outside stakeholders nor a strategic
basis for communicating with funding agencies or Congress. Most
importantly, it fails to either recognize or do anything about all the
different reasons why scientists and managers might not be
allowed to do their jobs, which can cover a broad range from
ﬁnancial limits on available resources to institutional and political
constraints or conﬂicts with existing economic interests. These
reasons help to explain the relative lack of progress to date in
developing an effective recovery framework for Gulf of Maine
Atlantic salmon.
In contrast, a SDM approach starts with values, not science, and
links recovery activities to understandable, carefully articulated
objectives. A range of alternatives are constructed and compared:
recovery efforts are not focused on developing a single best plan
but, instead, on building a range of plans that can be compared and
used as the jumping-off point for advancing preferred alternatives
based on an in-depth review of their consequences across a range
of dimensions. Uncertaintydstemming from both the consequences of management actions and the conﬁdence held in their
successful implementationdis addressed explicitly. When information is missing or of low quality, experts are asked to ﬁll in
these gaps using their subjective judgments, which in turn serve
as the basis for further deliberations and improved understanding
of hypotheses concerning possible barriers to recovery and
the outcomes of proposed actions. Costs and beneﬁts and risks are
compared using common metrics and ﬁnancial and personnel
constraints are introduced, with these limitations serving as
the basis for managers to address difﬁcult (but unavoidable)
trade-offs.
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The goal is to provide insight to resource managers and
other decision makers, not to make choices. Adoption of a sound
decision-aiding approach does not do away with the difﬁcult
choices that lie behind development of any successful recovery
framework. However, the hope is that the additional clarity
provided through use of an explicit and consistent decision-making
framework will permit scientists and decision makers, working
together with other parties, to move forward and to incorporate
and evaluate additional input from other stakeholders in
a systematic and transparent manner that, over time, will foster
both trust and collaboration.
In the case of ATS recovery efforts, one of the primary reasons
for testing a structured decision-making framework was to
encourage improved communication between scientists working
with a technical agenda and managers working with a policy or
political agenda. To a large degree, the use of an SDM approach has
been successful: managers and scientists within each of the three
lead agencies were able to work together on a common set of
problems, and both intra- and across-agency cooperation were
improved by developing consistent criteria with which to evaluate
a broad range of proposed recovery activities. Three aspects of the
approach were especially helpful: the deﬁnition of explicit objectives and sub-objectives to guide recovery efforts, the use of
transparent expert judgments to move forward when data was
scarce or substantial disagreements existed among participating
scientists, and the documentation of discussions relating to each
step of the decision-making framework as a vehicle for communicating the results of the workshop deliberations to a wider audience of scientists, managers, and politicians. These beneﬁts
continued to play a central role in discussions leading to publication of the March, 2011 “Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework,”
which builds on the earlier workshop deliberations and has been
approved by the NMFS, the DMR, and the FWS as well as the
Penobscot Indian Nation.
A number of additional considerations will inﬂuence the future
success of Atlantic salmon recovery efforts in the GoM. From
a management perspective, an obvious concern is the various
institutional constraints that might encourage managers and
scientists at one or more of the three lead agencies to continue to
engage in “business as usual.” From a science standpoint, a concern
is the success of ongoing efforts to characterize, assess, and report
uncertainties in a consistent manner across the different action
teams and resource management agencies. This will require additional attention to quantitative analyses as well as the qualitative
characterization of uncertainty, with decisions needing to be made
at each stage about the appropriate level of precision and the
preferred expression of biological uncertainty. From a governance
perspective, a concern is the relative risk tolerance of the different
management agencies, particularly with regard to the priority
given to expenditures across different categories (e.g., conservation
hatchery vs. marine survival) and across different types of recovery
actions (e.g., mitigation as compared to research). Another
unknown is the future success of efforts to obtain supplementary
funding for proposed management and research activities directed
to assist in Atlantic salmon recovery efforts.
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